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Abstract— We propose a hybrid spectrum and information
market for a database-assisted TV white space network, where
the geo-location database serves as both a spectrum market
platform and an information market platform. We study the inter-
actions among the database operator, the spectrum licensee, and
unlicensed users systematically, using a three-layer hierarchical
model. In Layer I, the database and the licensee negotiate the
commission fee that the licensee pays for using the spectrum
market platform. In Layer II, the database and the licensee
compete for selling information or channels to unlicensed users.
In Layer III, unlicensed users determine whether they should buy
the exclusive usage right of licensed channels from the licensee, or
the information regarding unlicensed channels from the database.
Analyzing such a three-layer model is challenging due to the
co-existence of both positive and negative network externalities
in the information market. We characterize how the network
externalities affect the equilibrium behaviours of all parties
involved. Our numerical results show that the proposed hybrid
market can improve the network profit up to 87%, compared with
a pure information market. Meanwhile, the achieved network
profit is very close to the coordinated benchmark solution (the
gap is less than 4% in our simulation).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
With the explosive growth of mobile smartphones and
bandwidth-hunger wireless applications, radio spectrum has
become increasingly scarce [1]. The UHF/VHF frequency band
originally assigned for broadcast television services (hereafter
called TV channels) has been viewed as a promising spectrum
opportunity for supporting new wireless broadband services.
First, in many places there are many vacant (unused) TV
channels (i.e., those unlicensed to any TV licensee), often
called TV white spaces [2]–[4], which can be used for sup-
porting unlicensed non-TV wireless services. Second, even the
licensed TV channels (i.e., allocated to certain TV licensee)
may be under a low utilization in most time [5], and hence
can be opportunistically reused by unlicensed non-TV wireless
services with the permissions of licensees.
To effectively exploit the TV white spaces while not harm-
ing the interests of licensed devices (TVs), the industry has
started to adopt a database-assisted TV white space network
architecture [6]–[9]. In this architecture, unlicensed devices
obtain the list of available unlicensed TV channels via querying
a certified white space geo-location database, which periodi-
cally updates information based on a repository of licensees.
Meanwhile, the FCC also allows the spectrum licensees to
temporarily lease their licensed channels to unlicensed devices
through, for example, auction [10]. Such spectrum trading
(leasing) requires a market platform, and the geo-location
database can potentially serve as such a platform (e.g., SpecEx
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[11]) due to its proximity to both spectrum licensees and
unlicensed devices. This means that the geo-location database
can facilitate the unlicensed spectrum access to both unlicensed
and licensed TV channels.
Recently, researchers have proposed several business and
marketing models related to the database-assisted spectrum
sharing, which can be categorized into two classes: Spectrum
Market and Information Market. The first class (spectrum
market [12]–[14]) mainly deals with the trading of licensed TV
channels. The key idea is to let spectrum licensees temporarily
lease their under-utilized licensed TV channels to unlicensed
users for some additional revenue. The database serves as a
market platform facilitating this trading process.1 A commer-
cial example of such a database-provided spectrum market
platform is SpecEx [11], operated by SpectrumBridge.2
The second class (information market) has been recently
introduced by Luo et al. for the unlicensed TV channels
(i.e., TV white spaces) [15], [16]. In their models, the geo-
location database sells the advanced information regarding the
quality of unlicensed TV channels, instead of channels, to
the unlicensed users for profit. The key motivation is that the
database knows more information regarding TV white spaces
than unlicensed users,3 and hence it can provide information
that helps unlicensed users improve their performances. A
practical example of information market is White Space Plus
[17], again operated by SpectrumBridge.
In practice, both the licensed TV channels and unlicensed
TV white spaces co-exist at a particular location. Some users
may prefer to lease the licensed TV channels from licensees
for the exclusive usage, while other users may prefer to share
the free unlicensed TV white spaces with others. Hence, a
joint formulation and optimization of both spectrum market
and information market is highly desirable. However, none of
the existing work [12]–[16] looked at the interaction between
spectrum market and information market. This motivates our
study of a hybrid spectrum and information market for the
database in TV white space networks.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we model and study a Hybrid Spectrum
and Information Market (HySIM) for a database-assisted TV
1For example, it acts as a spectrum broker or agent, purchases spectrum
from licensees and then resells the purchased spectrum to unlicensed users.
2The (secondary) spectrum market has been extensively used in dynamic
spectrum access networks (see, e.g., [18]–[22]), where auction, contract, and
pricing are commonly used theoretic models. The auction and contract models
usually focus on the information asymmetry. In this work, we mainly focus on
the interplay between the spectrum market and information. Hence, we will
consider the basic pricing model for the spectrum market.
3For example, based on the knowledge about the network infrastructures of
TV licensees and their licensed channels, the database can predict the average
interference (from licensed devices) on each TV channel at each location.
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white space network, in which the geo-location database serves
as (i) a spectrum market platform for the trading of (under-
utilized) licensed TV channels between spectrum licensees and
unlicensed users, and (ii) an information market platform for
the trading of advanced information (regarding the unlicensed
TV white spaces) between the database itself and unlicensed
users. Unlicensed users can choose to lease the licensed TV
channels from licensees (via the database) for the exclusive
usage, or to share the free TV white spaces with others. In the
latter case, users can further decide whether to purchase the
advanced information regarding these TV white spaces from
the database to enhance the performance.
Figure 1 illustrates such a database-provided HySIM
framework. Unlicensed users 1 and 2 lease the licensed TV
channels from the spectrum licensee (via the database-provided
platform), and users 3 and 4 share the free unlicensed TV white
spaces with others. User 4 further purchases the advanced
information to improve its performance.
In order to thoroughly understand the user behaving, the
market evolving, and the equilibrium in such a hybrid market,
we formulate the interactions among the geo-location database
(operator), the spectrum licensee, and unlicensed users as a
three-layer hierarchical model:
1) Layer I: Commission Negotiation (in Section V): In
the first layer, the database and the licensee negotiate the
commission fee that the spectrum licensee needs to pay for
using the spectrum market platform. Specifically, the database,
as the spectrum market platform, helps the spectrum licensee
to display, advertise, and sell the under-utilized TV channels
to unlicensed users. Accordingly, it takes some commission
fee from each successful transaction between the spectrum li-
censee and unlicensed users. In this work, we consider the rev-
enue sharing scheme (RSS), where the licensee shares a fixed
percentage of revenue with the database,4 and study the RSS
negotiation using the Nash bargaining theory [23].
2) Layer II: Price Competition Game (in Section IV):
In the second layer, the database and the spectrum licensee
compete with each other for selling information or channels
to unlicensed users. The spectrum licensee decides the price of
4Another commonly-used commission scheme is the so-called wholesale
pricing scheme (WPS), where the database charges the licensee a fixed price
for each successful transaction, regardless of the exact revenue of the licensee.
We will study the problem under WPS in our future work.
the licensed TV channels, and the database decides the price of
the advanced information (regarding the unlicensed TV chan-
nels). We analyze the equilibrium of such a price competition
game using the supermodular game theory [24].
3) Layer III: User Behaving and Market Dynamics (in
Section III): In the third layer, unlicensed users decide the
best purchasing decisions, given the database’s information
price and the licensee’s channel price. Note that the users’ best
purchasing behaviours dynamically change due to the negative
and positive network externalities of the information market
(see Section II-C for details). We will show how the market
dynamically evolves according to the users’ best choices, and
what the market equilibrium point is.
In summary, we list the main contributions as follows.
• Novelty and Practical Significance: To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper that proposes
and studies a hybrid spectrum and information market
for promoting the unlicensed spectrum access to both
licensed and unlicensed TV channels.
• Modeling and Solution Techniques: We formulate the
interactions as a three-layer hierarchical model, and
analyze the model by backward induction, using mar-
ket equilibrium theory, supermodular game theory, and
Nash bargaining theory, respectively.
• Performance Evaluations: Our numerical results show
that the proposed hybrid market can bring up to 87%
network profit gain, compared with a pure information
market. The gap between our achieved network profit
and the coordinated benchmark is less than 4%.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a database-assisted TV white space network
with a geo-location database and a set of unlicensed users
(devices) in a particular region (e.g., a city). Unlicensed users
can use the unlicensed TV channels (i.e., TV white spaces)
freely in a shared manner (e.g., using CDMA or CSMA).
Meanwhile, there is a spectrum licensee, who owns the li-
censed channels and wants to lease the under-utilized channels
to unlicensed users for additional revenue.5 Different from the
unlicensed TV white spaces, the licensed TV channels can
be used by unlicensed users in an exclusive manner (with the
permission of the licensee). Therefore, users can enjoy a better
performance (e.g., a higher data rate or a lower interference)
on the licensed channels. For convenience, let piL ≥ 0 denote
the (licensed) channel price set by the spectrum licensee.
A. Geo-location Database
1) Basic Service: According to the regulation policy (e.g.,
[4]), it is mandatory for a geo-location white space database
to provide the following information for any unlicensed user:
(i) the list of TV white spaces (i.e., unlicensed TV channels),
(ii) the transmission constraint (e.g., maximum transmission
power) on each channel in the list, and (iii) other optional
requirements. The database needs to provide this basic (infor-
mation) service free of charge for any unlicensed user.
5In case there are multiple spectrum licensees, we assume that they are
coordinated by the single representative. We will leave the case with multiple
competitive spectrum licensees to a future work.
32) Advanced Service: Beyond the basic information, the
database can also provide certain advanced information re-
garding the quality of TV channels (as SpectrumBridge did
in [17]), which we call the advanced (information) service, as
long as it does not conflict with the free basic service. Such
an advanced information can be rather general, and a typical
example is “the interference level on each channel” used in
[15], [16]. With the advanced information, the user is able to
choose a channel with the highest quality (e.g., with the lowest
interference level). Hence, the database can sell this advanced
information to users for profit. This leads to an information
market. For convenience, let piA ≥ 0 denote the (advanced)
information price of the database.
3) Leasing Service: As mentioned previously, the geo-
location database can also serve as a spectrum market platform
for the trading of licensed channels between the spectrum
licensee and unlicensed users, which we call the leasing
service. By doing this, the spectrum licensee shares a fixed
percentage δ ∈ [0, 1] of revenue with the database, which we
called the revenue share commission scheme (RSS).
B. Unlicensed User
Unlicensed users can choose either to purchase the licensed
channel from the licensee for the exclusive usage, or to share
the free unlicensed TV white spaces with others (with or
without advanced information). We assume that all licensed
and unlicensed TV channels have the same bandwidth (e.g.,
6MHz in the USA), and each user only needs one channel
(either licensed or unlicensed) at a particular time. Formally,
we denote s ∈ {b,a, l} as the strategy of a user, where
(i) s = b: Choose the basic service (i.e., share TV white
spaces with others, without the advanced information);
(ii) s = a: Choose the advanced service (i.e., share TV
white spaces with others, with the advanced information).
(iii) s = l: Choose the leasing service (i.e., lease the
licensed channel from the licensee for the exclusive usage).
We further denote B, A, and L as the expected utility that
a user can achieve from choosing the basic service (s = b),
the advanced service (s = a), and the leasing service (s = l),
respectively. The payoff of a user is defined as the difference
between the achieved utility and the service cost (i.e., the
information price when choosing the advanced service, or the
leasing price if choosing the leasing service). Let θ denote
the user’s evaluation for the achieved utility. Then, the payoff
of a user with an evaluation factor θ can be written as
ΠEUθ =

θ ·B, if s = b,
θ ·A− piA, if s = a,
θ · L− piL, if s = l.
(1)
Each user is rational and will choose a strategy s ∈ {b,a, l}
that maximizes its payoff. Note that different users may have
different values of θ (e.g., depending on application types),
hence have different choices. That is, users are heterogeneous
in term of θ. For convenience, we assume that θ is uniformly
distributed in [0, 1] for all users6.
Let ηB, ηA, and ηL denote the fraction of users choosing
the basic service, the advanced service, and the leasing service,
6This assumption is commonly used in the existing literature. Relaxing to
more general distributions often does not change the main insights [25], [26].
respectively. For convenience, we refer to ηB, ηA, and ηL as the
market shares of the basic service, the advanced service, and
the leasing service, respectively. Obviously, ηB, ηA, ηL ≥ 0 and
ηB +ηA +ηL = 1. Then, the normalized payoffs (profits) of the
spectrum licensee and the database are, respectively,{
ΠSL , ΠSL(I) = piLηL(1− δ),
ΠDB , ΠDB(I) = piAηA + piLηLδ.
(2)
C. Positive and Negative Network Externalities
There are two types of network externalities coexisting in
the information market: (i) negative externality, which corre-
sponds to the increasing level of congestion and degradation
of user performance due to more users sharing the same
TV white space, and (ii) positive externality, which is due
to the quality increase of the (advanced) information when
more users purchasing the information. Next we analytically
quantify these two network externalities.
We first have the following intuitive observations for a
user’s expected utilities of three strategy choices:
• L is a constant and independent of ηA, ηB, and ηL. This
is because a user uses the licensed channels in an exclusive
manner, hence its performance (on licensed channels) does not
depend on the activities of others.
• B is non-increasing in ηA + ηB (the total fraction of
users using TV white space) due to the congestion effect. This
is because more users using TV white spaces (in a shared
manner) will increase the level of congestion on these channel,
hence reduce the performance of each user.
• A is non-increasing in ηA + ηB, due to the congestion
effect (similar as B). This is referred to as the negative
network externality of the information market.
• A is non-decreasing in ηA, given a fixed value of
ηA + ηB. This is because more users purchasing the advanced
information will increase the quality of the information. This
is referred to as the positive network externality.
For convenience, we write B as a non-increasing function
f(·) of ηA + ηB (or equivalently, 1− ηL), i.e.,
B , f(ηA + ηB),
and write A as the combination of a non-increasing function
f(·) of ηA + ηB and a non-decreasing function g(·) of ηA, i.e.,
A , f(ηA + ηB) + g(ηA).
Note that f(·) reflects the congestion effect in the information
marekt, and is identical in B and A (as users experience the
same congestion effect in both basic and advanced services),
and g(·) reflects the performance gain induced by the advanced
information, i.e., the value of advanced information.
Since there is no congestion on the licensed channels, it is
reasonable to assume that L > A and L > B. We can further
assume that A > B, that is, the additional gain g(ηA) from
the advanced information is positive.7 To facilitate the later
7Note that if we assume L < B, then users will never choose the leasing
service even with a zero channel price piL . In this case, our model degenerates
to the pure information market, similar as that in [15]. Moreover, if A = B,
then users will never choose the advanced service even with a zero information
price piA . In this case, our model degenerates to a monopoly spectrum market
(where the licensee is the monopolist). In this sense, our hybrid market model
generalizes both the pure spectrum market and pure information market.
4Layer I: Commission Negotiation
The database and the spectrum licensee negotiate the commission
charge details (i.e., δ under RSS).
⇓
Layer II: Price Competition Game
The database determines the information price piA;
The spectrum licensee determines the channel price piL .
⇓
Layer III: User Behaving and Market Dynamics
The unlicensed users determine and update their best choices;
The market dynamically evolves to the equilibrium point.
Fig. 2. Three-layer Hierarchical Interaction Model
analysis, we further introduce the following assumptions on
functions f(·) and g(·).
Assumption 1. f(·) is non-negative, non-increasing, convex,
and continuously differentiable.
Assumption 2. g(·) is non-negative, non-decreasing, concave,
and continuously differentiable.
The non-increasing and convexity assumption of f(·)
reflects the increasing of marginal performance degradation
under congestion, and is widely used in wireless networks with
congestion effect (see, e.g., [26], [27] and references therein).
The non-decreasing and concavity assumption of g(·) reflects
the diminishing of marginal performance improvement induced
by the advanced information. In this work, we use the generic
functions f(·) and g(·), which can generalize many practical
scenarios with the explicit advanced information definition
(e.g., those proposed by Luo et al. in [15], [16], where
the advanced information is the interference level on each
channel). We provide more detailed discussion about generic
functions and practical scenarios in the Appendix of [29].
D. Three-Layer Interaction Model
Based on the above discussion, a hybrid spectrum and
information market involves the interactions among the geo-
location database, the spectrum licensee, and the unlicensed
users. Hence, we formulate the interactions as a three-layer
hierarchical model illustrated in Figure 2.
Specifically, in Layer I, the database and the spectrum
licensee negotiate the commission charge details (regarding
the spectrum market platform), i.e., the revenue sharing factor
δ ∈ [0, 1]. In Layer II, the database and the spectrum licensee
compete with each other to attract unlicensed users. The
database determines the price piA of the advanced information,
and the spectrum licensee determines the price piL of the
licensed channel. In Layer III, the unlicensed users determine
their best choices, and dynamically update their choices based
on the current market shares. Accordingly, the market dynam-
ically involves and finally reaches the equilibrium point.
In the following sections, we will analyze this three-layer
interaction model systematically using backward induction.
III. LAYER III – USER BEHAVIOR AND MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study the user behavior and market
dynamics in Layer III, given the database’s information price
piA and the licensee’s channel price piL (in Layer II). In the
following, we first discuss the user’s best choice, and show how
0 1
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Fig. 3. Illustration of θLB , θAB , and θLA .
the user behavior dynamically evolves, and how the market
converges to an equilibrium point.
A. User’s Best Strategy
Now we study the best strategy of users, given the prices
{piL, piA} and the initial market state {η0L , η0A, η0B} where η0B +
η0A + η
0
L = 1. Notice that each user will choose a strategy that
maximizes its payoff defined in (1). Hence, for a type-θ user,
its best strategy is 8
s∗θ = l, iff θ · L− piL > max{θ ·A− piA, θ ·B}
s∗θ = a, iff θ ·A− piA > max{θ · L− piL, θ ·B}
s∗θ = b, iff θ ·B > max{θ · L− piL, θ ·A− piA}
(3)
where B = f(1− η0L ), and A = f(1− η0L ) + g(η0A).
To better illustrate the above best strategy, we introduce
the following notations:
θLB , piLL−B , θAB ,
piA
A−B , θLA ,
piL−piA
L−A .
Intuitively, θLB denotes the smallest θ such that a type-θ
user prefers the leasing service than the basic service; θAB
denotes the smallest θ such that a type-θ user prefers the
advanced service than the basic service; and θLA denotes the
smallest θ such that a type-θ user prefers the leasing service
than the advanced service. Notice that A and B are functions
of initial market shares {η0L , η0A, η0B}. Hence, θLB, θAB, and θLA
are also functions of {η0L , η0A, η0B}.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship of θLB, θAB, and θLA.
Intuitively, Figure 3 implies that the users with a high utility
evaluation factor θ are more willing to choose the leasing
service in order to achieve a large utility. The users with a
low utility evaluation factor θ are more willing to choose the
basic service so that they will pay zero service cost. The users
with a middle utility evaluation factor θ are willing to choose
the advanced service, in order to achieve a relatively large
utility with a relatively low service cost. Notice that when the
information price piA is high or the information value (i.e.,
A− B) is low, we could have θLB < θAB, in which no users
will choose the advanced service (as illustrated in the lower
subfigure of Figure 3).
Next we characterize the new market shares (called the
derived market shares) resulting from the users’ best choices
mentioned above. Such derived market shares are important for
analyzing the user behavior dynamics and market evolutions
in the next subsection. Recall that θ is uniformly distributed
in [0, 1]. Then, given any initial market shares {η0L , η0A}, the
newly derived market shares {ηL, ηA} are
• If θLB > θAB, then ηL = 1−θLA and ηA = θLA−θAB;
8Here, “iff” stands for “if and only if”. Note that we omit the case of
θ ·L−piL = max{θ ·A−piA, θ ·B}, θ ·A−piA = max{θ ·L−piL, θ ·B},
and θ ·B = max{θ ·L−piL, θ ·A−piA}, which are negligible (i.e., occurring
with zero probability) due to the continuous distribution of θ.
5• If θLB ≤ θAB, then ηL = 1− θLB and ηA = 0.
Formally, we have the following derived market shares.
Lemma 1. Given any initial market shares η0L and η0A, the
derived market shares ηL and ηA are given by{
ηL = max
{
1−max{θLA, θLB}, 0
}
,
ηA = max
{
min{θLA, 1} − θAB, 0
}
.
(4)
The results in Lemma 1 assume that all users update the
best strategies once and simultaneously. Since θLB, θAB, and
θLA are functions of initial market shares {η0L , η0A}, the derived
market shares {ηL, ηA} are also functions of {η0L , η0A}, and
hence can be written as ηL(η0L , η
0
A) and ηA(η
0
L , η
0
A).
B. Market Dynamics and Equilibrium
When the market shares change, the users’ payoffs (on the
advanced service and basic service) change accordingly, as A
and B change. As a result, users will update their best strate-
gies continuously, hence the market shares will evolve dynam-
ically, until reaching a stable point (called market equilibrium).
In this subsection, we will study such a market dynamics and
equilibrium, given the prices {piL, piA}.
For convenience, we introduce a virtual time-discrete sys-
tem with slots t = 1, 2, . . ., where users change their decisions
at the beginning of every slot, based on the derived market
shares in the previous slot. Let (ηtL, η
t
A) denote the market
shares derived at the end of slot t (which serve as the initial
market shares in the next slot t + 1). We further denote 4ηL
and 4ηA as the changes (dynamics) of market shares between
two successive time slots, e.g., t and t+ 1, that is,
4ηL(ηtL, ηtA) = ηt+1L − ηtL, 4ηA(ηtL, ηtA) = ηt+1A − ηtA, (5)
where (ηt+1L , η
t+1
A ) are the derived market share in slot t+ 1,
which can be computed by Lemma 1. Obviously, if both 4ηL
and4ηA are zero in a slot t+1, i.e., ηt+1L = ηtL and ηt+1A = ηtA,
then users will no longer change their strategies in the future.
This implies that the market achieves a stable state, which we
call the market equilibrium. Formally,
Definition 1 (Market Equilibrium). A pair of market shares
η∗ = {η∗L , η∗A} is a market equilibrium, if and only if
4ηL(η∗L , η∗A) = 0, and 4ηA(η∗L , η∗A) = 0. (6)
Next, we study the existence and uniqueness of the market
equilibrium, and further characterize the market equilibrium
analytically. These results are very important for analyzing the
price competition game in Layer II (Section IV).
Proposition 1 (Existence). Given any feasible price pair
(piL, piA), there exists at least one market equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness). Given any feasible price pair
(piL, piA), there exists a unique market equilibrium (η∗L , η
∗
A), if
there exists a tuple (ηL, ηA) with ηL + ηA ≤ 1 such that9
g′(ηA)
g(ηA)
· L−BL−A ≤ 1. (7)
A practical implication of (7) is that if the information
value g(ηA) (positive network externality) does not increase
9Here, g′(ηA) is the first-order derivative of g(·) with respect to ηA . Note
that A is a function of ηA and ηL , and B is a function of ηL .
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Fig. 4. Illustration of Market Dynamics and Market Equilibrium. Red Curve:
4ηL(ηL, ηA) = 0; Blue Curve: 4ηA(ηL, ηA) = 0. The intersection between
blue and red curve is the market equilibrium.
very fast with ηA, then there exists a unique equilibrium.
Note that the condition (7) is sufficient but not necessary for
the uniqueness. In particular, we observe through numerical
simulations that in some cases, the market converges to a
unique equilibrium for a wide range of prices under which the
condition (7) is violated. Nevertheless, the sufficient condition
in (7) leads to the insight that if the impact of positive network
externality is significant, there may exist multiple equilibrium
points. Note that even if there exist multiple equilibrium points,
the market always converges to a unique one of them, given
the initial market shares. Please refer to [29] for more details.
For a better understanding, we illustrate the dynamics of
market shares in Figure 4. The x-axis denotes the leasing
service’s market share-ηL, and the y-axis denotes the advanced
service’s market share-ηA. Notice that a feasible pair of market
shares {ηL, ηA} satisfies ηL +ηA ≤ 1. An arrow denotes the dy-
namics of market shares under a particular initial market shares
(at the starting point of the arrow). For example, from the initial
market shares η0 = {ηL = 0.6, ηA = 0}, the market will evolve
to η1 = {0.32, 0.16}, then η2 = {0.35, 0.2}, and eventually
converge to the equilibrium point η∗ = {0.33, 0.24}. The red
curve denotes the isoline of 4ηL(ηL, ηA) = 0, and the blue
curve denotes the isoline of 4ηA(ηL, ηA) = 0. By Definition
1, the intersection between the blue curve and the red curve is
the market equilibrium point. In this example, there is a unique
market equilibrium point.
Suppose the uniqueness condition (7) is satisfied. We
characterize the unique equilibrium by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Market Equilibrium). Suppose the uniqueness
condition (7) holds. Then, for any feasible price pair (piL, piA),
the unique market equilibrium is given by
(a) If θLB(ηL, ηA)|ηL=0 ≤ θAB(ηL, ηA)|ηA=0, then there is
a unique market equilibrium η† = {η†L , η†A} given by
η†L = 1− θLB(η†L , η†A), and η†A = 0; (8)
(b) If θLB(ηL, ηA)|ηL=0 > θAB(ηL, ηA)|ηA=0, then there is
a unique market equilibrium η∗ = {η∗L , η∗A} given by{
η∗L = 1− θLA(η∗L , η∗A),
η∗A = θLA(η
∗
L , η
∗
A)− θAB(η∗L , η∗A).
(9)
Proof: First, we obtain the derived market shares by
substituting the market shares given in (8) or (9) into (4).
6Then, we can check the above derived market shares satisfy
the equilibrium condition (6). For the detailed proof, please
refer to [29].
IV. LAYER II – PRICE COMPETITION GAME
EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study the price competition between
the database and the spectrum licensee in Layer II, given the
commission negotiation solution in Layer I and based on the
market equilibrium prediction in Layer III. We will analyze the
game equilibrium under the revenue sharing scheme (RSS). We
first define the price competition game (PCG) explicitly.
• Players: The database and the spectrum licensee;
• Strategies: The database’s strategy is the price piA of
its advanced information, and the licensee’s strategy
is the price piL of its licensed channels;
• Payoffs: The payoffs of players are defined in (2)
under RSS.
For convenience, we write the (unique) market equilibrium
η∗ = {η∗L , η∗A} in Layer III as functions of prices (piL, piA),
i.e., η∗L (piL, piA) and η
∗
A(piL, piA). Intuitively, we can interpret
η∗L (·) and η∗A(·) as the demand functions of the licensee and
the database, respectively.
Assume that the licensee shares a fixed percentage δ ∈
[0, 1] of revenue with the database. Then, by (2), the payoffs
of the licensee and the database can be written as:{
ΠSL(I)(piL, piA) = piL · η∗L (piL, piA) · (1− δ),
ΠDB(I) (piL, piA) = piA · η∗A(piL, piA) + piL · η∗L (piL, piA) · δ.
(10)
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium). A pair of prices (pi∗L , pi∗A) is
called a Nash equilibrium, if
pi∗L = arg max
piL≥0
ΠSL(I)(piL, pi
∗
A),
pi∗A = arg max
piA≥0
ΠDB(I) (pi
∗
L , piA).
(11)
It is notable that directly solving the Nash equilibrium is
very challenging, due to the difficulty in analytically charac-
terizing the market equilibrium {η∗L (piL, piA), η∗A(piL, piA)} under
a particular price pair {piL, piA}. To this end, we transform
the original price competition game (PCG) into an equivalent
market share competition game (MSCG). The key idea is to
view the market share as the strategy of the database or the
licensee, and the prices as functions of the market shares.
Specifically, we notice that under the uniqueness condition
(7), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the market
equilibrium {η∗L , η∗A} and the prices {piL, piA}.
In this sense, once the licensee and the database choose
the prices {piL, piA}, they have equivalently chosen the market
shares {η∗L , η∗A}. Hence, we obtain the equivalent market share
competition game—MSCG, where the strategy of each player
is its market share (i.e., ηL for the licensee and ηA for the
database), and the prices {piL, piA} are functions of the market
shares {ηL, ηA}. Substitute θLA = piL−piAL−A and θAB = piAA−B into
(9), we can derive the inverse function of (9), where prices are
functions of market shares, i.e.,10
piL(ηL, ηA) =(1− ηL) · (L− f(1− ηL)− g(ηA))
+ (1− ηL − ηA) · g(ηL),
piA(ηL, ηA) =(1− ηL − ηA) · g(ηA).
(12)
Accordingly, the payoffs of two players can be written as:{
Π˜SL(I)(ηL, ηA) = piL(ηL, ηA) · ηL · (1− δ),
Π˜DB(I) (ηL, ηA) = piA(ηL, ηA) · ηL + piL(ηL, ηA) · ηL · δ.
(13)
Similarly, a pair of market shares (η∗L , η
∗
A) is called a Nash
equilibrium of MSCG, if η∗L = arg maxηL Π
SL
(I)(ηL, η
∗
A) and
η∗A = arg maxηA Π
DB
(I) (η
∗
L , ηA).
We first show that the equivalence between the original
PCG and the above MSCG.
Proposition 3 (Equivalence). If {η∗L , η∗A} is a Nash equilibrium
of MSCG, then {pi∗L , pi∗A} given by (12) is a Nash equilibrium
of the original price competition game PCG.
We next show that the MSCG is a supermodular game
(with minor strategy transformation), and then derive the Nash
equilibrium using the supermodular game theory [24].
Proposition 4 (Existence). The MSCG is a supermodular
game with respect to ηA and −ηL. Hence, there exists at least
one Nash equilibrium (η∗L , η
∗
A).
The following proposition further gives the uniqueness
condition of the Nash equilibrium in MSCG.
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness). The MSCG has a unique Nash
equilibrium (η∗L , η
∗
A), if
−∂
2Π˜SL(I)(ηL,ηA)
∂(−ηL)2 ≥
∂2Π˜SL(I)(ηL,ηA)
∂(−ηL)∂ηA , −
∂2Π˜DB(I) (ηL,ηA)
∂(−ηL)2 ≥
∂2Π˜DB(I) (ηL,ηA)
∂ηA∂(−ηL) .
The above uniqueness conditions are quite general, and
follow the standard supermodular game theory. Next we pro-
vide a specific example to illustrate these conditions more
intuitively. Consider the following example: f(ηA + ηB) =
α1−β1·(ηA+ηB) and g(ηA) = β2·ηA. That is, both positive and
negative network effects change linearly with the respective
market shares. In this example, we can obtain the following
uniqueness condition: L − α1 − β1 > β2. Namely, if L is
large enough or β2 is small enough, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium in MSCG.
Once we obtain the Nash equilibrium (η∗L , η
∗
A) of MSCG,
we can immediately obtain the Nash equilibrium (pi∗L , pi
∗
A) of
the original PCG by (12). It is notable that we may not be able
to derive the analytical Nash equilibrium of MSCG, as we use
the generic functions f(·) and g(·). Nevertheless, thanks to the
nice property of supermodular game, we can easily numerically
compute the Nash equilibrium of MSCG through, for example,
the simple best response iteration in [29].
V. LAYER I – COMMISSION BARGAINING SOLUTION
In this section, we study the commission negotiation among
the database and the spectrum licensee in Layer I, based on
their predictions of the price equilibrium in Layer II and the
market equilibrium in Layer III.
10We omit the trivial case in (8), where the database has a zero market
share, as this will never the case at the pricing equilibrium of Layer II.
7Specifically, we want to find a feasible revenue sharing
percentage δ ∈ [0, 1] under RSS that is satisfactory for both
the database and the spectrum licensee. We formulate the
commission negotiation problem as a one-to-one bargaining,
and study the bargaining solution using the Nash bargaining
theory [23].
Following the Nash bargaining framework, we first de-
rive the database’s and the licensee’s payoffs when reaching
an agreement and when not reaching any agreement (hence
reaching the disagreement). Specifically, when reaching an
agreement δ, the database’s and the licensee’s payoffs are
ΠDB(I) (δ) and Π
SL
(I)(δ) derived in Section IV, respectively. When
not reaching any agreement (reaching the disagreement), the
licensee’s profit is ΠSL0 = 0, and the database’s profit is
ΠDB0 = pi
†
A · η†A(pi†A), where pi†A and η†A(pi†A) are the database’s
optimal price and the corresponding market share in the pure
information market.11 Then, the Nash bargaining solution is
formally given by
max
δ∈[0,1]
(
ΠDB(I) (δ)−ΠSL0
) · (ΠSL(I)(δ)−ΠDB0 )
s. t. ΠDB(I) (δ) ≥ ΠSL0 , ΠSL(I)(δ) ≥ ΠDB0 .
(14)
Note that analytically solving (14) may be difficult, as it is
hard to characterize the analytical forms of ΠDB(I) (δ) and Π
SL
(I)(δ).
Nevertheless, we notice that the bargaining variable δ lies in
closed and bounded range of [0, 1], and the objective function
of (14) is bounded. Hence, there must exist an optimal solution
for (14), which can be found by using many one-dimensional
search methods (e.g., [28]).
Proposition 6 (δ-Bargaining Solution). There must exist an
optimal solution for the problem (14). If the objective function
of (14) is monotonic, the optimal solution is unique.
VI. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, we provide simulations to evaluate the
system performance (e.g., the network profit, the database’s
profit, and the licensee’s profit) achieved under revenue sharing
scheme (RSS).
1) Commission Bargaining Solution and Equilibrium Retail
Price: We first show the Nash bargaining solution of RSS, and
the corresponding equilibrium retail prices. In this simulation:
We choose the function f(ηL) = α1−β1 · (1− ηL)γ1 to model
the negative network externality, and choose the function g =
α2 +(β2−α2) ·ηAγ2 to model the positive network externality.
We fix α1 = 1.8, α2 = 1, β1 = 0.8, β2 = 1.2, γ1 = 0.8,
γ2 = 0.6, and change the leasing service quality L from 6 to
10.
Figure 5 shows the bargaining solution under different de-
gree of network externality. For fair comparison, we transform
the revenue sharing factor δ∗ under RSS into the equivalent
wholesale price by w∗ = δ∗ · η∗L . From this figure, we can
see that the equivalent wholesale price increases with L under
different degree of network externality. This is because a higher
quality of leasing service attracts more users to the licensed
channels, and hence a higher wholesale price is desired to
compensate the database’s revenue loss from the advanced
11Note that such an optimal price and market share can be derived in the
same way as in Section IV, by simply setting L = 0.
service. Moreover, the wholesale price under strong negative
networker externality is higher than that under strong positive
network externality. This is because when the information
market is negative network externality, the increases number
of users will severely jeopardize the quality of unlicensed TV
channels. Hence, users are willing to choose licensed channels
in order to obtain guarantee quality of service. In such case,
the database wants to increase the wholesale price to maintain
its revenue.
Figure 6 shows the equilibrium retail prices under the bar-
gaining solution. We can see that the equilibrium price of the
database (denoted by DB) is almost independent of L, while
the equilibrium price of the licensee (denote by LH) increases
with L. This is because a higher quality of leasing service will
attract more users to the licensed channels, and thus allows
the licensee to charge a higher service price. Moreover, the
equilibrium price of licensee under strong negative network
externality is higher than that under strong positive externality.
This is because under strong negative network externality,
the small increase of users in the information market will
dramatically decreases the quality of unlicensed TV channels.
Hence, the licensee can charge a higher price due to more
users will choose leasing service.
2) System Performance: Now we show the network
profit, i.e., the aggregate profit of the database and the li-
censee achieved under both RSS in Figure 7 given the fixed
network externality. In this figure, we use the black dash-dot
line (with mark +) to denote the coordination benchmark,
where the database and the licensee act as an integrated party
to maximize their aggregate profit. We use the red dash-dot
line (with mark ×) to denote the non-cooperation benchmark
(with pure information market only), where the database does
not want to display the licensee’s licensed channel information.
The brown dash-dot line (with mark •) denotes the case where
the licensee sells channels on a third-party spectrum market
platform.
Figure 7 shows that our proposed RSS outperform the non-
cooperation scheme significantly (e.g., increasing the network
profit up to 87%). It further shows that the gap between our
proposed RSS and coordination benchmark is small (e.g., less
than 4%). Such a gap is caused by the imperfect coordination
of the database and the licensee. In other words, they cooperate
somewhat but not coordinate completely. We call this gap as
the non-coordination loss. We can also see that our proposed
RSS always outperforms the scheme with a third-party plat-
form, in terms of the network profit.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a database-provided hybrid
spectrum and information market, and analyze the interactions
among the database, the licensee, and the unlicensed users
systematically. We also analyze how the network externalities
(of the information market) affect these interactions. Our work
not only captures the performance gain introduced by the
hybrid market, but also characterizes the impact of different
degree of networker externality on the market equilibrium
behaviours of all parties involved. There are several possible
directions to extend this work. One is to consider an oligopoly
scenario with multiple databases (hence multiple platforms). In
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this scenario, databases compete with each other for unlicensed
users as well as for spectrum licensees.
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APPENDIX
A. Property of Information Market
In this section, we will discuss the properties of two types
of network externalities in the information market: the negative
network externality and the positive network externality. For
illustration purpose, we explicit define the advance information
as those proposed by Luo et al. in [15], [16]. In the following,
we first define the advanced information as the interference
level on each channel, then we characterize the information
value to the users. Based on that, we can further characterize
the properties of the information market.
1) Interference Information: For each user n ∈ N oper-
ating on the TV channel, each channel k is associated with
an interference level, denoted by zn,k, which reflects the
aggregate interference from all other nearby devices (including
TV stations and other users) operating on this channel. Due
to the fast changing of wireless channels and the uncertainty
of users’ mobilities and activities, the interference zn,k is a
random variable. We impose assumptions on the interference
zn,k as follows.
Assumption 3. For each user n ∈ N , each channel k’s in-
terference level zn,k is temporal-independence and frequency-
independence.
This assumption shows that (i) the interference zn,k on
channel k is independent identically distributed (iid) at dif-
ferent times, and (ii) the interferences on different channels,
9zn,k, k ∈ K, are also iid at the same time.12 As we are
talking about a general user n, we will omit the user index
n in the notations (e.g., write zn,k as zk), whenever
there is no confusion caused. Let Hz(·) and hz(·) denote
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability
distribution function (PDF) of zk, ∀k ∈ K.13
Usually, a particular user’s experienced interference zk on
a channel k consistss of the following three components:
1) vk: the interference from licensed TV stations;
2) wk,m: the interference from another user m operating
on the same channel k;
3) ok: any other interference from outside systems.
The total interference on channel k is zk = vk + wk + ok,
where wk ,
∑
m∈Nk wk,m is the total interference from all
other users operating on channel k (denoted by Nk). Similar
to zk, we also assume that vk, wk, wk,m, and ok are random
variables with temporal-independence (i.e., iid across time)
and frequency-independence (i.e., iid across frequency). We
further assume that wk,m is user-independence, i.e., wk,m,m ∈
Nk, are iid. It is important to note that different users may
experience different interferences vk (from TV stations),
wk,m (from another user operating on the same channel),
and ok (from outside systems) on a channel k, as we have
omitted the user index n for all these notations for clarity.
Next we discuss these interferences in more details.
• The database is able to compute the interference vk
from TV stations to every user (on channel k), as it
knows the locations and channel occupancies of all
TV stations.
• The database cannot compute the interference ok from
outside systems, due to the lack of outside interference
source information. Thus, the interference ok will not
be included in a database’s advanced information sold
to users.
• The database may or may not be able to compute
the interference wk,m from another user m, depend-
ing on whether user m subscribes to the database’s
advanced service. Specifically, if user m subscribes
to the advanced service, the database can predict
its channel selection (since the user is fully rational
and will always choose the channel with the lowest
interference level indicated by the database at the time
of subscription), and thus can compute its interference
to any other user. However, if user m only chooses the
database’s basic service, the database cannot predict
12Note that the iid assumption is a reasonable approximation of the practical
scenario. This is because users with basic service will randomly choose one
TV channel, hence the number of such users per channel will follow the
same distribution. For users with advanced service, they will go to the TV
channel with the minimum realized interference. If the interference among
each pair of users is iid over time, then statistically the number of such users
in each channel will also follow the same distribution. Note that even though
all channel quality distributions are the same, the realized instant qualities
of different channels are different. Hence, the advanced information provided
by the database is still valuable as such an advanced information is accurate
interference information.
13In this paper, we will conventionally use HX(·) and hX(·) to denote the
CDF and PDF of a random variable X , respectively.
its channel selection, and thus cannot compute its
interference to other users.
For convenience, we denote N [a]k , as the set of users
operating on channel k and subscribing to the database’s
advance service (i.e., those choosing the strategy s = a), and
N [b]k as the set of users operating on channel k and choosing
the database’s basic service (i.e., those choosing the strategy
s = b). That is, N [a]k
⋃N [b]k = Nk. Then, for a particular
user, its experienced interference (on channel k) known by
the database is
z¯k , vk +
∑
m∈N [a]k
wk,m, (15)
which contains the interference from TV licensees and all
users (operating on channel k) subscribing to the database’s
advanced service. The user’s experienced interference (on
channel k) not known by the database is
zˆk , ok +
∑
m∈N [b]k
wk,m, (16)
which contains the interference from outside systems and all
users (operating on channel k) choosing the database’s basic
service. Obviously, both zˆk and z¯k are also random variables
with temporal- and frequency-independence. Accordingly, the
total interference on channel k for a user can be written as
zk = z¯k + zˆk.
Since the database knows only z¯k, it will provide this
information (instead of the total interference zk) as the
advanced service to a subscribing user. It is easy to see
that the more users subscribing to the database’s advanced
service, the more information the database knows, and the
more accurate the database information will be.
Next we can characterize the accuracy of a database’s
information explicitly. Note that ηA and ηL denote the fraction
of users choosing the advanced service and leasing licensed
spectrum, respectively. Moreover, (1 − ηA − ηL) denotes the
fraction of users choosing the basic service. Hence, there
are (1 − ηL) · N users in the network that we consider
operating on the TV channels. Due to the Assumption 3, it
is reasonable to assume that each channel k ∈ K will be
occupied by an average of NK · (1 − ηL) users. Then, among
all NK · (1 − ηL) users operating on channel k, there are, on
average, NK · ηA users subscribing to the database’s advanced
service, and NK · (1 − ηA − ηL) users choosing the database’s
basic service. That is, |Nk| = NK ·(1−ηL), |N [a]k | = NK ·ηA, and
|N [b]k | = NK ·(1−ηA−ηL).14 Finally, by the user-independence
of wk,m, we can immediately calculate the distributions of z¯k
and zˆk under any given market share ηA and ηL via (15) and
(16).
2) Information Value: Now we evaluate the value of the
database’s advanced information to users, which is reflected
by the user’s benefit (utility) that can be achieved from this
information.
We first consider the expected utility of a user when
choosing the database’s basic service (i.e., s = b). In this case,
the user will randomly choosing a TV channel based on the
14Note that the above discussion is from the aspect of expectation, and in
a particular time period, the realized numbers of users in different channels
may be different.
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information provided in the free basic service, and its expected
data rate is
R0(1− ηL) = EZ [R(z)] =
∫
z
R(z)dHz(z), (17)
where R(·) is the transmission rate function (e.g., the Shannon
capacity) under any given interference. As shown in Section
A1, each channel k ∈ K will be occupied by an average of
N
K ·(1−ηL) users based on the Assumption 3. Hence, R0(1−ηL)
depends only on the distribution of the total interference zk,
and thus depends on the fraction of users operating on TV
channels (i.e., 1 − ηL). Then the expected utility provided by
the basic service is:
B(1− ηL) = U
(
R0(1− ηL)
)
, (18)
where U(·) is the utility function of the user. We can easily
check that the more users operating on the TV channels, the
higher value of zk is, and thus the lower expected utility pro-
vided by the basic service. Hence, the basic service’s expected
utility reflects the congestion level of the TV channels. We use
the function f(·) to characterize the congestion effect and have
f(1− ηL) = B(1− ηL).
Then we consider the expected utility of a user when
subscribing to the database’s advance service. In this case,
the database returns the interference {z¯k}k∈K to the user
subscribing to the advanced service, together with the basic
information such as the available channel list. For a rational
user, it will always choose the channel with the minimum z¯k
(since {zˆk}k∈K are iid). Let z¯[l]MIN = min{z¯1, . . . , z¯K} denote
the minimum interference indicated by the database’s advanced
information. Then, the actual interference experienced by a
user (subscribing to the database’s advanced service) can be
formulated as the sum of two random variables, denoted by
z(a) = z¯MIN + zˆ. Accordingly, the user’s expected data rate
under the strategy s = a can be computed by
Ra(ηA, ηL) = Ez(a)
[R (z(a)) ] = ∫zR(z)dHz(a)(z), (19)
where Hz(a)(z) is the CDF of z(a). It is easy to see that Ra
depends on the distributions of z¯k and zˆk, and thus depend
on the market share ηL and ηA. Thus, we will write Ra as
Ra(ηL, ηA). Accordingly, the advanced service’s utility is:
A(ηL, ηA) , U
(
Ra(ηL, ηA)
)
(20)
Note that the congestion effect also affects the value of
A. However, compared with the utility of user choosing basic
service, the benefit of a user subscribing to the database’s ad-
vanced information is coming from the z¯[l]MIN, i.e., the minimum
interference indicated by the database’s advanced information.
As the value of z¯[l]MIN depends on the ηA only, we can get
the approximation A = f(1 − ηL) + g(ηA), where function
g(·) characterize the benefit brought by z¯[l]MIN and denotes the
positive network effect.
By further checking the properties of B(1 − ηL) and
A(ηL, ηA), we have the Assumption 1 and Assumption 2.
